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HOW FAR SHOULD THE PTO
REGULATE BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS OF PATENT
PRACTITIONERS?
Kenneth R. Shurtz*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the American Bar
Association (ABA) have both established rules of professional conduct
intended to regulate the practice of attorneys.' While the PTO's standards
regulate the practice of patent attorneys and patent agents that practice
before it, the ABA's standards are adopted in whole or in part by the
majority of the states to regulate the practice of attorneys within each state.2
Patent attorneys are bound by both PTO rules and the state Rules of
Professional Conduct found within their respective state. While for the
most part, the PTO rules have been effective, periodically, uncertainties
within the rules and conflicts between the PTO rules and state rules have an
adverse affect on the business practices of patent attorneys. The current
PTO rules offer little guidance as to how courts should deal with those
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009; Bachelor of
Science, Mechanical Engineering, Wichita State University, 2001.
1. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, MPOC I - MODEL STANDARDS, ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility MPOC 1:301, EC 1-1, Preamble; see generally William
Jacob, ProfessionalEthics before the USPTO: A Discussionfor Beginners, 16 PROF. LAW. 22 (2005).
2. ABA Model Rule State Narratives, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm.
3. Simone A. Rose and Debra R. Jessup, Whose Rules Rule? Resolving Ethical Conflicts During
the Simultaneous Representationof Clients in Patent Prosecution, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 571 (2003).
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uncertainties and conflicts. Although the current PTO rules allow for
preemption of state rules,4 the PTO rules only displace state rules to the
extent necessary to accomplish the PTO's federal objectives, 5 which has
been largely inadequate to resolve these conflicts.
The PTO enforces its regulations by investigating patent practitioners
that may have violated its Code of Professional Responsibility and holding
disciplinary proceedings when necessary.6 If a client or third party files a
complaint with the PTO alleging misconduct or violations of a disciplinary
rule, the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) initiates an
investigation. The results of the investigation are reviewed by the OED's
Committee on Discipline, comprised of at least three PTO employees
appointed by the Patent Commissioner.7 If the Committee on Discipline
agrees by majority vote to bring charges of a violation, the Director
commences disciplinary proceedings. 8
At the disciplinary proceeding, an administrative law judge 9 determines
whether a violation occurred; in finding a violation, the judge may issue a
reprimand, 10 a suspension, or exclusion from further practice before the
office."l The judge considers not only the patent practitioner's interaction
with the PTO, but also the nature of the practitioner's relationship with
clients and third parties.' 2 The nature of the relationship may be investigated
through examination of contracts or agreements between patent practitioners
and clients, client interviews, or client responses to request-for-information
(RFI) forms regarding their understanding of various aspects of any
agreements.' 3 While these rules aim to regulate the practice of practitioners
before the PTO, 14 the rules also dictate many aspects of the business
relationship between practitioner and client.15 This note examines the effects
of the PTO's rules on the practitioner-client relationship, the necessity of
those effects in accomplishing the PTO's objectives, and how the PTO can
revise the proposed rules to accomplish its goals without needlessly
prohibiting ethical business practices.
4. 37 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2008); Sperry v. Florida ex. rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 386 (1963)
("Nothing in this part shall be construed to preempt the authority of each State to regulate the practice
of law, except to the extent necessary for the Patent and Trademark office to accomplish its Federal
objectives.").
5. Id.
6. 37 C.F.R § 10.132 (2008).
7. 37 C.F.R § 10.4(a) (2008).
8. 37 C.F.R. § 10.4(b) (2008).
9. 37 C.F.R. § 10.139 (2008).
10. 37 C.F.R. § 10.132 (b)(1) (2008).
11. 37 C.F.R. § 10.132(b)(2) (2008).
12. See Bender v. Dudas, 490 F.3d 1361, 1364, 1369 (2007).
13. Id. at 1364, 1369.
14. See generally William Jacob, Professional Ethics before the USPTO: A Discussion for
Beginners, 16 PROF. LAW. 22 (2005).
15. 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-10.112 (2008).
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II. PTO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Under its authority to regulate patent practitioners, 6 the PTO
established the Code of Professional Responsibility PTO Code), patterning
them after an old version of the ABA Model Code.' The PTO Code is set
out in canons and disciplinary rules.' 8 The canons outline the norms of
professional conduct expected of patent practitioners "in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession,"' 9
while the disciplinary rules set the "minimum level of conduct below which
no practitioner can fall without being subjected to disciplinary action. '

A. PTO

STANDARDS

The PTO's Code of Professional Responsibility for those that practice
before the office is located in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 2'
The nine canons 22 in the PTO Code set out general guidelines for the PTO
Code of Professional Responsibility for
23 patent practitioners, including both
patent attorneys and patent agents.
Canon 1 states that practitioners
should assist "in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession; 2 4 Canon 2 involves making "legal counsel available; '25 Canon
3 states that practitioners should "assist in preventing the unauthorized
practice of law;"526 Canon 4 states that practitioners must preserve client
confidentiality; 27 Canon 5 states practitioners must exercise "independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client; ' ' 28 Canon 6 involves
representing a client with competence; 29 Canon 7 states practitioners should
zealously represent a client "within the bounds of the law; ' 30 Canon 8
involves "improving the legal system," 3' and Canon 9 states practitioners

16. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2008).
17. Rose and Jessup, supra note 3, at 581.
18. 37 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2008).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

37
37
37
37
37
37

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§ 10.20(a) (2008).
§ 10.20(b) (2008).
§ 10.20-10.112 (2008).
§ 10.20(a) (2008).
§§ 10.1-10.112 (2008).
§ 10.21 (2008).

25. 37 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2008).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

37
37
37
37
37
37

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§
§
§
§
§
§

10.46 (2008).
10.56 (2008).
10.61 (2008).
10.76 (2008).
10.83 (2008).
10.100 (2008).
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"should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety., 32 These
nine canons are modeled after the old version of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, as are many of the PTO's disciplinary rules.33
The ABA states that "obviously the Canons. .. and Disciplinary Rules
cannot apply to non-lawyers," but then asserts that the public has a right to
expect ethical conduct from lawyer's associates as well, in "matters
pertaining to professional employment."34 The PTO, within their statutory
authority, has expanded these canons to apply to non-attorneys that practice
as patent agents before the board.3 5
The PTO's disciplinary rules, many of which are modeled after the
ABA's Model Code, derive from the general principles expressed in the
canons; the disciplinary rules provide detailed explanations of conduct in
keeping with the principles expressed in the canons to establish a
"minimum level of conduct" required for patent practitioners.36 These
explanations provide proper notice to patent practitioners of what conduct
is expected of them in practicing before the board and of
the disciplinary
37
actions and sanctions against breaches in ethical conduct.
B.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE

PTO

The PTO derives its authority to regulate the practice of patent
practitioners under Federal statute, which provides:
The [PTO] may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law,
which... may govern the recognition and conduct of ...
attorneys ... representing applicants or other parties before the
Office, and may require them.., to show that they are of good
moral character and reputation and are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons
valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the
Office .... 38

32. 37C.F.R. § 10.110 (2008).
33. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 10 (2008), with ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,
supra note 1; see also Rose and Jessup, supra note 3, at 581.
34. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, MOPC 1:301, EC 1-1, Preamble,
(2003).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2008).
36. See Rose and Jessup, supra note 3, at 581; 37 C.F.R. § 10.20(b) (2008).
37. Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.15. ("We note that disciplinary action under
the ABA Model Rules is properly pursued under the Disciplinary Rules (DR's) but not the more general
Canons of Ethics .... In contrast, the Canons 'are statements of axiomatic norms, expressed in general
terms, from which the Disciplinary Rules are derived."' (citations omitted)).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2008).
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Since the PTO has statutory authority to establish and enforce the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the PTO's interpretations of its rules
39
at disciplinary proceedings are analyzed under the Chevron framework.
An agency's interpretations
of its own regulations should prevail over a
~40
court's interpretation, unless clearly erroneous.
When a regulation is
questioned, the courts look to the authorizing statute for guidance, and if
the statute does not address the issue or if it is ambiguous, courts defer to
the agency's reasonable interpretation.41
C. PREEMPTION OF STATE RULES

The Code of Federal Regulations states that nothing in the PTO's
rules should be "construed to preempt [State law], except to the extent
necessary for the Patent and Trademark Office to accomplish its federal
objectives. ' 2 This section codified the scope of federal preemption
recognized by the Supreme Court in Sperry v. Florida,373 U.S. 379, 400
(1963). Both the current and proposed PTO rules reject any intent to
preempt state authority to regulate the practice of law, which necessarilyX
leaves many conflicts and preemption issues open to interpretation.
Despite the PTO's broad discretion to interpret their own rules, most often
it is the courts that decide whether the PTO rules preempt state laws; the
result is that the PTO Code rarely preempts state law and when preemption
does occur, outcomes vary from state to state.44
III. EFFECTS ON BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
A.

NEGLECT OF AN ENTRUSTED LEGAL MATTER

One of the grounds most frequently relied upon by the PTO for
disciplining a practitioner is "(i) neglect of a client's interest, (ii) prejudice
39. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
40. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
41. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
42. 37 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2008) (this section relies on the scope of federal preemption recognized by
the Supreme Court in Sperry v. Florida,373 US 379, 400 (1963)); Rose and Jessup, supra note 3, at
596.
43. Letter from Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law
Association, to Jon Dudas, Under Secretary, USPTO, at Detailed Appendix (June 6, 2004), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/oedrep/aipla2.html.
44. Los Angeles County Bar Association Prof'l Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No.
507 (2001); District of Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Comm. Op. No. 195 (1988).
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or damage to a client's interest, or (iii) failure to carry out a contract of
employment. 4 5 Disciplinary proceedings brought by the Director for
neglect arise under Rule 10.77(c), which simply states that a practitioner
shall not "neglect a legal matter entrusted to the practitioner. 4 6 This rule is
largely modeled after ABA Model Code Rule 1.3.47 The ABA defines
neglect under this rule as "indifference and a consistent failure to carry out
obligation" which "usually involves more than a single act.' '48 The ABA
also states that errors of judgment made in good faith are not considered
neglect. 49 Although modeled after
the ABA rule, the PTO does not defer to
50
the ABA definition of neglect.
While the PTO does not define neglect, comments issued by the PTO
indicate that "under § 10.77(c), neglect could be based on a single instance
of neglect" and makes no mention of good faith errors.51
Neglect of an entrusted legal matter often arises when practitioners
fail to file office actions by certain deadlines resulting in excess fees or
damaging their client's interests.52
In Bender v. Dudas, the PTO
recognized neglect of an entrusted legal matter when Bender, a patent
practitioner, failed to effectively communicate pertinent issues to his
clients.53 The Federal Circuit noted Bender's inadequate engagement
letters to his clients as substantial evidence in support of the PTO's
determination of neglect.54 The form letters failed to adequately explain
the difference between a design patent and a utility patent.55 The court
noted the engagement letter to each client was "essentially the same," and
failed to provide advice geared toward each client as to whether a design or
utility patent was "best suited to protect the invention" and the
consequences of pursuing each type of patent.56 The discussion in the letter
of the difference between a design and a utility patent was an "entirely

45. Harry I. Moatz, Avoiding Misconduct Complaints in Patent Prosecution, Advanced Patent
Prosecution Workshop 2007: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing, PLI Order No. 11375, 909
PLI/Pat 9, 21 (2007).
46. 37 C.F.R. § 10.77(c) (2008).
47. See Timir Chheda, A Handy List: Comparison of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct With the Patent Rules of Ethics, 5 J.MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 476, 484 (2006)
(comparing the PTO rules and ABA Model Rules), and Rose and Jessup, supra note 3, at 581
(discussing how many PTO disciplinary rules are modeled after the old ABA Model Code).
48. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1273 (1973).
49. Id.
50. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 10012 (Mar. 16, 1984).
51. Id.
52. Bender v. Dudas, 490 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Moatz v. Rosenburg, Proceeding No.
D06-07, 5-6 (2007); Moatz, supra note 45, at 22-30.
53. Bender, 490 F.3d at 1366.
54. Id. at 1367.
55. Id. at 1366.
56. Id. at 1364.
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hollow and formalistic gesture. 57 Complicating matters, Bender had
received payments from an invention-promoter to represent each client. 58
An invention promoter is defined in 35 U.S.C. section 297(c) as any entity
that procures or offers to procure development or marketing services for a
client's invention and acquires clients "through advertising in any mass
media." The court then suggested that the invention-promoter's moneyback guarantee motivated Bender's failure to communicate to his clients
the consequences of pursuing design patents over utility patents.5 9
Although the circumstances in Bender were evidence of his intent, under
PTO guidelines, intent is not a requirement to find neglect of an entrusted
legal matter under 37 C.F.R. section 10.77(c).6 ° One might infer from the
PTO's determination and the Federal Circuit's affirmance in Bender, that
form engagement letters to clients, which explain initial basic patent
concepts, could easily violate Rule 10.77(c). Such a broad holding would
necessarily raise the question of how in depth and how extensive a
practitioner's communication with each client must be. Potentially, as
demonstrated in Bender, the sufficiency of a communication could be
determined by a client's subjective understanding-or lack of
understanding-of the concepts in each communication or agreement.
Perhaps the ruling in Bender should not read so broadly. The situation
in Bender involved a series of ethical violations of which the form
engagement letter was only one issue. 6' Bender's case involved especially
egregious conduct including engaging in fraud and deceit at the expense of
his clients.62 The analysis of the PTO and the court in Bender's case
suggest implicitly that the totality of the circumstances-the money-back
guarantee, inadequate engagement letters, conflicts of interest, and the
client's lack of understanding-played a determinative role in finding rule
violations.63 If these extenuating circumstances had not been present, it is
unclear whether the disciplinary hearing would have found violations of the
PTO Code. However, it should be noted that the PTO has never explicitly
acknowledged a totality of the circumstances test to determine if conduct
constituted a violation. Although the PTO stated that one instance of
neglect could be termed a violation, most disciplinary hearings involve
multiple violations and extenuating circumstances. Regardless of this
observation, patent practitioners would still be well advised to avoid using
form letters under extenuating circumstances, such as possible conflicts of
interest or other indications that the client's rights are vulnerable.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1364.
See Moatz, supra note 45, at 22-23.
Bender, 490 F.3d at 1364.
Id.
Id. at 1366-67.
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In practice, lawyers consistently use form letters in client
communications. A well-crafted form letter could sufficiently explain
basic patent concepts from which the client could make an informed
decision. Given the increasing burden of the practitioner in explaining a
client's interests, rules of engagement, fee arrangements, and other aspects
of the practitioner-client business relationship, it seems clear that the use of
form letters, standard disclosure letters and form contracts during client
representation is a necessity. As long as the client's interests are
sufficiently guarded and there is no other evidence of ethical violations,
form letters by patent practitioners should not be looked upon as suspect in
violation of Rule 10.77(c). The PTO could further reduce the uncertainty
within 10.77(c) by further defining neglect, addressing good-faith errors
and giving more detailed guidance as to interpreting and enforcing
10.77(c), particularly within the context of form letters.
B. FULL DISCLOSURE TO THE CLIENT
Two other commonly violated disciplinary rules, sections 10.62(a) and
10.68 of the PTO Code, deal with the concept of full disclosure to the
client. 64 Section 10.62(a) requires that when a practitioner's own interests
might impair their independent "professional judgment," the practitioner
should refuse employment "except with the consent of a client after full
disclosure. 65 Section 10.68 requires that the practitioner avoid influence
"by others than the client." 66 Additionally, subsections 10.68(1) and
10.68(2), state that practitioners should not receive compensation from a
third party relating to the practitioner's legal services or representation to
the client, unless the client consents after full disclosure.67
To determine violations under Rules 10.62 and 10.68, the PTO
disciplinary proceeding must first determine if the practitioner fully
disclosed the circumstances to the client and whether the client consented
in response to the disclosure. The PTO must also determine when the
practitioner's interests might impair professional judgment regarding client
representation. In Bender, this conflict of interest was apparent from the
circumstances of the practitioner's involvement with an invention-promoter
combined with other highly questionable conduct.6 8
The PTO's
disciplinary hearing determined that adequate disclosure in Bender's case
would require disclosing to each client his employment with the invention-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

37 C.F.R.
37 C.F.R.
37 C.F.R.
Id.
Bender v.

§ 10.62(a) (2008); 37 C.F.R. § 10.68 (2008).
§ 10.62(a) (2008).
§ 10.68 (2008).
Dudas, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2562, 42-48, (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2006).
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promoter, the conflicts of interest caused by a money-back guarantee and
the invention-promoter's prior bad acts.69
Full disclosure under
Rule 10.68(1) also required that Bender disclose the amount of the
payments from the invention-promoter.7 °
While there is little question Bender's clients did not receive full
disclosure nor give informed consent, these issues reveal the uncertainties
within rules Rule 10.62 and 10.68 which may adversely affect the everyday
business practices of patent practitioners. Currently, the PTO does not
specifically define full disclosure; PTO disciplinary hearings determine
whether full disclosure has been satisfied on a case-by-case basis and
courts defer to an agency's own interpretations of their own regulations. 7
The PTO could significantly reduce this uncertainty by revising the
associated rules to more fully define the requirements offull disclosure and
informed consent, while being mindful of the business needs of patent
practitioners.
The PTO has recently proposed Rule 11. 107 to clarify the concept of
full disclosure.72 The proposed rule suggests it would be "prudent" for a
practitioner to provide potential clients "a written summary of the
considerations disclosed, and to request and receive a written consent,"
however, proposed Rule 11.107 does not require the disclosure be in
writing. 73
In practice, there might be instances in which oral
communication to the client could disclose information even more
effectively than a written document, as the practitioner could better respond
to questions in person. Alternately, proposed Rule 11.107 does require that
a client's informed consent be in writing. 74 This concept could be further
clarified in the proposed rule because it is unclear whether informed
consent must be a separate writing, whether the client must produce the
writing or whether the client's signature on a form is sufficient.
Additionally, in long-standing business relationships between a patent
practitioner and a client, it seems needless to require disclosure and consent
repeatedly throughout the course of that relationship. Since the full
disclosure and written informed consent requirement cannot be waived, it
would seem a separate disclosure and consent would be necessary for every
potential change in the business relationship. This raises the concern that
the current and proposed PTO rules might interfere with the rights of the
practitioner and client to lawfully contract with one another.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
72. James E. Rogan, Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office; Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,442, 69,474 (proposed Dec. 12, 2003) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 10, and 11), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/notices/68fr69442.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id.at 69,549-50.
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Another aspect of disclosure addressed in the proposed rules involves
the sufficiency of the disclosure.75 In the supplementary information
section of the proposed rules, the PTO further defines fidl disclosure as a
standard that may be different for sophisticated clients as compared to
unsophisticated clients.76 According to the ABA, the disclosure required
by "informed consent" requires communicating the "material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. 77 The
proposed PTO Rules 11.107, 11.108, and 11.109 suggest that if any interest
under 10.62(a) has even the "potential" to cause a conflict-of-interest, then
the circumstance should be disclosed.78 Although the PTO standard is
higher, the flexible standard expressed in the supplementary information
section of the proposed rules reinforces the view that requirements for full
disclosure might vary from client to client. Although the lack of disclosure
in Bender is apparent, would the same be true of a more sophisticated
client? For instance, if Bender's clients had been a large company with an
established patent portfolio, it is arguable that the form engagement letter
might have been an adequate disclosure. Furthermore, if such a company
had in-house counsel, the need for the patent practitioner to explain the
dynamics of the business relationship or the intricacies of patent law would
seem redundant. The need for a standard of disclosure that accounts for the
sophistication of the client is apparent and the PTO should include this
guidance as a definition within the rules themselves.
Another consideration is that by making the adequacy of full
disclosure depend on the sophistication of the client, this increases the
amount of time and costs incurred by the patent practitioner in representing
unsophisticated clients, such as first-time individual inventors or small
companies. As a practical result, many patent practitioners may refuse to
take individual inventors or charge prohibitive up-front costs. 79 Individual
inventors, eager to save money, would be more easily lured by inventionpromoters promising lower costs. While much of the PTO's proposals
requiring extensive disclosure and written consent seems aimed at
preventing misuse by invention-promoters, the resulting increased costs
might discourage innovation by individual inventors. To counter this, the
PTO might consider further reducing costs for small entities or creating a
new "ultra-small" entity. 80 Alternatively, state or federal regulations could
address abuses by invention promoters by limiting their activities,
75. Id. at 69,474.
76. Id.
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/rule l_0.html
78. Rogan, supra note 72, at 69,549-51.
79. See Individual Inventors: Who Will Represent You Now?, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2007/06/individual-inve.html (June 21, 2007, 20:03 CST).
80. Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a Costly Barrier to
Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184, 205 (2004).
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advertising or business practices, many of which are not validly within the
jurisdiction of the PTO. In attempting to regulate invention-promoters by
substantially increasing the burden on patent practitioners in dealing with
individual clients and increasing costs for the individual inventor, the
patent system becomes less efficient and more burdensome for the
individual inventor.
This variable standard also raises the question of how one
differentiates unsophisticated clients from sophisticated clients. Individual
inventors, many of whom have little exposure to patent prosecution, are the
exact type of unsophisticated client vulnerable to misrepresentation and
neglect. Companies with large patent portfolios can be presumed to know
the difference between design and utility patents and such a disclosure
would seemingly be unnecessary. However, there is obviously a gray area
in which a small company might not necessarily be as savvy as they appear
in seeking patent protection. Ideally through the course of prosecution, the
patent attorney or patent agent should be able to quickly discover a client's
lack of knowledge regarding patents. In such a case, application of the full
disclosure rule would be less mechanical and would require closer
examination of what the patent attorney should have known regarding their
client and the representations the client made to the patent attorney.
Further complicating the disclosure standard, the Federal Circuit held
in Brasseler v. Stryker Sales Corporation that "inventors represented by
counsel are presumed to know the law. 8' This presumption would seem to
reduce the amount of disclosure required. The factual circumstances of
Brasseler, however, are distinguishable in that the patentees claimed that
ignorance of the law relieved them of their duty under Rule 1.56 to disclose
information relating to an on-sale bar. 82 There was additional evidence that
Brasseler understood the concept of an on-sale bar-the fact that Brasseler
had applied for and received a patent and sued to enforce that patent; this
evidence also suggested that Brasseler was a sophisticated client. 83 Had
Brasseler been an unsophisticated client with little evidence to suggest an
understanding of what information was material to disclose, it is uncertain
whether this presumption would have applied to find inequitable conduct
on the client's duty to disclose. The holding of Brasseler,however, is most
applicable to circumstances involving inequitable conduct for failure to
disclose under Rule 1.56. Even if this holding did apply to all disclosure
in practitioner-client relationships, the presumption that a client knew the
law would not relieve a patent practitioner of the duty to fully disclose
issues that may compromise the client's interests. Since the circumstances
81.
82.
83.
84.

Brasseler, U.S.A. I., L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1385.
Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008).
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of the Rule 1.56 violations in Brasseler are distinct from other disclosures
between patent practitioners and their clients, it is doubtful that clients
would be presumed to know the law within the context of the PTO Code of
Professional Responsibility.
C. PRACTITIONER-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS

1. Fee-Splitting
Under PTO Rule 10.48, a practitioner cannot share or split legal fees
with a non-practitioner, except for a few enumerated exceptions.
This
rule seems to contemplate partnerships between patent attorneys and patent
agents. However, ABA Model Rule 5.4(a) states that a lawyer or law firm
shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, 86 while Rule 5.4(b) states that
a lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law. 87 Concurrently
applied, these rules may conflict, as shown when one state bar association
declared that a patent agent and attorney could not form a partnership to
prosecute patents.88 Additionally, the ABA issued a formal opinion, which
it later rejected, that an attorney practicing law with a non-attorney violates
state law that prohibits such partnerships. 89 By prohibiting practitioner and
85. 37 C.F.R. § 10.48 (2008).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/mrpctoc.html.
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/mrpc-toc.html.
88. Nassau County B. Op. No. 44/88 (Aug. 5, 1988).
89. ABA Comm. On Prof I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 257 (1944), rejecting Formal
Opinion 201, stated the following:
... the question was presented as to whether or not it is proper for a lawyer to enter
into a partnership with a layman enrolled on the register of attorneys of the United
States Patent Office as entitled to represent applicants in the presentation and
prosecution of applications for patents, provided clear indication is given in
connection with the use of the firm name of the respective professional qualifications
of the partners and provided the business of the partnership was limited to the
prosecution of patent applications, the rendering of opinions on patentability,
preparation of patent assignments and license agreements and giving opinions on
infringement. The Committee held that when a lawyer engaged in a business which is
one that would be regarded as the practice of the law when handled by a lawyer, it
continues to be the practice of law so far as the lawyer who is engaged in the business
is concerned; that if the lawyer member of the proposed partnership rendered any of
the services above described, his professional skill and responsibility as a lawyer
would be engaged and, consequently, he would be practicing law; that the fact that the
law member also is permitted by the rules of the Patent Office to render the same
services does not change the conclusion that the business of the proposed partnership
would be the practice of law and, accordingly, Canon 33 was violated, as well as
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patent agent partnerships, these opinions demonstrate the dilemma caused
by conflicting PTO and state ethics rules. A similar conflict is present
under PTO Rule 10.48, which could be viewed to prohibit partnerships
between patent attorneys and non-practitioner attorneys-a common
business relationship in numerous law firms. The PTO rules seem to preempt this situation, but does not expressly do so. Prospective revisions to
the PTO Code should consider these detrimental effects to ethical business
practices and expressly state either detailed exceptions to the rule or an
intent to preempt state rules.
2. Contingent Fees and Royalties
Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, an
attorney is allowed to take ownership in a client's interests in exchange for
performing legal services, such as receiving royalties or ownership of a
client's stock. The attorney must satisfy Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement that the
fees be "reasonable," the attorney must disclose any possible conflicts
under Rule 1.7(b) and the terms to the client must be "fair and reasonable"
under Rule 1.8(a). 90 The PTO has similar provisions under 37 C.F.R.
section 10.65, which requires that the practitioner "not enter into a business
transaction with a client" if the practitioner has "differing interests" than
the client that might affect professional judgment. 91 Again, there is an
exception if the client has consented after receiving full disclosure from the
practitioner. One area of contention might be what constitutes differing
interests. If the practitioner arranges to receive 5 percent royalties from
sales of a patented invention, it would seem that the interests of both the
practitioner and the client would best be served by prosecuting a high
quality patent. It is uncertain whether a contingent fee in patent
prosecution is per se a differing interest and if so, whether the signed
royalty agreement would satisfy full disclosure and informed consent.
ABA Rule 1.8(a) is even more restrictive than the corresponding PTO
Rule 10.65, since Rule 1.8 covers more than client relations, requires
written "fair and reasonable" terms and informed consent.92 This creates a
conflict between the rules, since patent attorneys must adhere to both PTO
Rule 10.65 and Rule 1.8(a) or the corresponding state rule. While it is
possible for the PTO Code to preempt state law, the PTO Code rarely does
so since Rule 10.1 expressly rejects any intent to preempt state authority to
govern the practice of law.93 Although the Supreme Court held that the

90.
91.
92.
93.

Canon 34, which prohibits the division of fees for legal services with a layman.
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof]I Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000).
37 C.F.R. § 10.65 (2008).
Chheda, supra note 47, at 482.
37 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2008).
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prosecution of patents is considered "the practice of law," 94 this still does
not subject patent agents to the state laws regulating the practice of law.
This uneven application leads to a situation where patent agents could
validly create a fee agreement in accordance with ethical standards, where
patent attorneys could not. For instance under Rule 1.8(a), a 75 percent
royalty to a patent attorney might be termed beyond what is "fair and
reasonable," yet if a patent agent contracted an identical agreement, under
PTO Rule 10.65, such an agreement would be allowable providing full
disclosure and consent. Whether or not this result is unintended should be
clarified by the PTO in updated revisions to its rules. Either "fair and
reasonable" should be added to the PTO Rules regarding fees or Rule 10.65
should expressly state a preemptive effect over state rules modeled on Rule
1.8(a).
Several cases demonstrate the uncertainty in resolving conflicts
between the PTO Code and state ethics rules regarding fee-splitting. In
Buechel v. Bain, the court ruled that while PTO's standard under 37 C.F.R.
10.64(a)(3) allowed the patent attorney to take an interest in a patent in lieu
of a fee, the attorney must still meet disclosure requirements under the NY
state bar's disciplinary rules.95 In California, the Los Angeles County Bar
said that a patent attorney could agree to a contingent fee in exchange for
patent prosecution. 96 Additionally, the bar decided that 5 percent of net97
profits from the patented invention was not considered unconscionable.
Further, the attorney was not required to comply with California's version
of ABA Model Rule 1.8(a). 98 The District of Columbia Bar held the same
as the Los Angeles County Bar.99 These varying outcomes further confuse
the question of when the PTO Code applies and when state ethics rules
apply.
The PTO's proposed Rule 11.504 does little to resolve conflicts
concerning fee-sharing or partnerships. Unlike ABA Model Rule 5.4, the
proposed rule does not prohibit fee-sharing arrangements between nonlawyers and lawyers. 00 This reiterates the inference that patent agents and
patent attorneys can validly create partnerships. Despite this implied intent
to include this type of partnership in the PTO Code, almost every state has
adopted a state bar rule similar to ABA Model Rule 5.4 prohibiting such an
94. Sperry v. Honda, 373 U.S. 379, 393 (1963).
95. Buechel v. Bain, 713 N.Y.S. 2d 332, 340 (N.Y. 2000).
96. Los Angeles County Bar, supra note 44.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Los Angeles County Bar did not address the PTO Rules, although the bar decided the
attorney did have to comply with California Business & Professions Code section 6147(a) regulating
contingent fees.
99. District of Columbia Bar, supra note 44.
100. Letter from Dennis Archer, President of the ABA, to Jon Dudas of the USPTO, Re: Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, at 21, (June 14, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/PTOEthicsLetter.06.14.04.doc.
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arrangement.101
As previously discussed, states could conceivably
discipline a patent attorney for such an arrangement under the state's code.
The issue of whether a patent attorney and patent agent or a patent attorney
and non-practitioner attorney can form partnerships should not be open to
interpretation by state judges. As part of its revisions to the PTO Code, the
PTO should define which partnerships are allowed under the code and
expressly provide preemption over state rules that could prevent those
partnerships. Partnerships between patent agents, patent attorneys and nonpractitioner attorneys are foreseeable partnership arrangements in patent
prosecution that by their nature do not compromise the clients' interests or
the PTO canons of professional responsibility.
IV. ADDITIONAL PROPOSED PTO RULES
Proposed PTO Rules 11.504 and 11.701 contain provisions that target
the growing problem of unscrupulous invention-promoters, discussed at
length in Bender. Proposed Rule 11.504(b) states, among other things, that
"a practitioner accepting a client referred by an invention-promoter shall
not divide legal fees paid by the client with the promoter for legal services
rendered in regard to practice before the Office.' 0 2 The rule goes on to
prohibit the transfer of funds between a practitioner and invention-promoter
before or after services, which would presumably prevent fee arrangements
designed to circumvent the rules.10 3 The legal services the practitioner is
prohibited from engaging in with the invention-promoter include "but are
not limited to, providing an opinion regarding the patentability of the
client's invention,. . . registrability of a mark, preparing a patent or
trademark application, and prosecuting a patent or trademark
application."'1 4 This rule has taken an aggressive stance against inventionpromoters, and it would seem that the objective of this rule is already
accomplished in PTO Rules 10.47(a) and (c) that prohibit aiding a nonpractitioner and a non-attorney in the unauthorized practice of law, 10.49
which prohibits forming a partnership with a non-practitioner, and 10.48
which prohibit sharing legal fees with a non-practitioner.105 Additionally,
the PTO has used Rules 10.62(a) (compromised professional judgment),
10.68(a)(1) (barring accepting compensation from a third party) and
10.77(c) (neglecting an entrusted legal matter) to sanction a practitioner,
when employment with an invention-promoter compromised clients'
101. Topical Overview, ABA Model Rule 5.4, State Narratives of ABA Model Rules, available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm#5.4.
102. Rogan, supra note 72, at 69557.
103. Id. at 69496.
104. Id. at 69557.
105. 37 C.F.R. § 10.47 (2008); 37 C.F.R. §10.49 (2008); 37 C.F.R. § 10.48 (2008).
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interests. 0 6 However, this rule does call attention to the growing problem
of invention-promoters and by doing so, ensures proper notice and
discourages practitioners from becoming involved with inventionpromoters. In practice, a practitioner could write opinion letters of
patentability of an invention for a promoter, but under this rule would be
precluded from accepting that inventor as a client. While certainly an
aggressive rule, it appears to accomplish its goal in an enforceable manner.
One provision of Rule 11.701 targets the actions of third parties and
invention promoters by seeking to regulate "communications concerning a
practitioner's services."' 0 7
Although paragraph (a) applies to "a
practitioner, or another on behalf of a practitioner," it is questionable
whether the PTO has jurisdiction over someone who is not registered to
practice before the PTO. 10 8 Largely modeled after ABA Model Rule 7.1,
proposed Rule 11.701 includes subsection (b) and (c), which the ABA
deleted from the current Model Rule 7.1.109 Subsection (b) and (c) relate to
communications and advertising that might "create unjustified expectations
about results" and that "compare the lawyer's services with other lawyer's
services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated." ' 10 The
necessity of including these provisions within 11.701 is questionable, given
that enforcement would be largely subjective and advertising in itself does
not directly involve practice before the PTO.
Other provisions of Rule 11.701 target the actions of third partiesspecifically invention-promoters."'
Section 11.701 attempts to obtain
jurisdiction over, or to control conduct of "another, on behalf of the
practitioner."'"12
Despite the PTO's broad discretion in creating,
interpreting and applying their own Rules of Professional Responsibility,
attempts to regulate the actions of third parties that do not practice before
the office could be held to step outside those bounds by the courts. Rules
preventing a third party, such as an invention-promoter, from performing
acts that a patent practitioner is prohibited from doing, however well
intentioned, could be difficult to enforce. The PTO Code "can only govern
the conduct of practitioners."" 3 Furthermore, the sanctions only limit or
exclude practitioners from practicing before the office and cannot provide

106. Moatz v. Bender, Proceeding No. 99-04, 1, (2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/
sol/foia/oed/disc/D2000-0 I.pdf.
107. Rogan, supra note 72, at 69498.
108. Id. at 69558 (emphasis added).
109. Id at 69559; ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (2004 & pre-2002) available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/aba/ (comparing pre-2002 ABA Model Rules with the current
version).
110. Rogan, supra note 72, at 69559.
111. Id.

112. Id.
113. Letter from Dennis Archer, supranote 100, at 22.

Winter 2009

PTO PATENT PRACTITIONER REGULATION

meaningful sanctions against a third party directly.' 4 As such, these
provisions should be further revised to expressly prohibit a practitioner
from acting in accordance with a third party that conducts the prohibited
activities. As far as preventing invention-promoters from performing or
advertising patent prosecution services, state business codes might be a
more effective way to prohibit the activity directly.
Proposed section 11.504 essentially combines current sections 10.48
and 10.49, into one rule regarding the professional independence of a
practitioner." 5 Rule 11.504 restates the current conditions prohibiting the
partnership of a patent practitioner with a non-practitioner, but does not
explicitly state that it pre-empts state law. Again, the PTO should
explicitly state the intent to preempt state regulations within this rule to
allow the valid and ethical business practice of patent attorneys and patent
agents working in a partnership. Although, the scope of a patent attorney's
duties differs from those of a patent agent's duties, there is no inherent
conflict of interests that should preclude them from forming a partnership
to represent a client.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the most part, the current PTO Code of Professional
Responsibility achieves its goal of regulating conduct to ensure the
integrity of the practice before the PTO and to protect client's interests.
The rules accomplish this goal by providing notice of acceptable conduct to
practitioners and deterring misconduct through disciplinary hearing and
sanctions. However, the PTO must also be sensitive to unintentional
interpretations of the rules that may adversely affect practitioner's business
practices. As a transactional practice, patent practitioners must rely on
practitioner-client business relationships and business contracts for their
livelihood, more so than litigation attorneys. In particular, small firms or
solo practitioners that deal primarily with individual inventors could be
adversely affected by some interpretations of the rules regarding
disclosures to the client. Although vague rules may offer the PTO
flexibility in interpretation and enforcement, this does not provide proper
notice to practitioners as to the requirements of professional conduct. To
reinforce the notice function of the PTO Code, the PTO should revise the
rules to more clearly define ambiguous terms and avoid unnecessarily
regulating ethical business practices that do not endanger the ethical
114. The third party could be excluded from any future practice before the PTO; however, if the
invention-promoter has no intention of practicing before the PTO, this sanction might not have much
direct effect on their business.
115. Rogan, supra note 72, at 69557-58.
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standards of the PTO or the clients' interests.
The PTO may have been trying to avoid conflict in avoiding questions
of pre-emption by relying on a general preemption phrase that allows for
preemption "only necessary to the extent to accomplish its Federal
directives."' 1 6 However, by failing to analyze how ABA standards and
PTO standards apply to patent practitioners, this has created even more
conflicts. It seems inconsistent not to preempt state ethics rules in
situations where the PTO has specifically contemplated and regulated
business relationships and fee-arrangement standards. To maintain the full
force and effectiveness of its Code of Professional Responsibility, the PTO
needs to specifically call out which ABA standards it intends to preempt
and rely on the general preemption phrase only as a catch-all exception for
certain unforeseen situations. Since the PTO is given extremely broad
discretion to regulate the professional conduct of practitioners, the PTO
should carefully examine the business necessities of practitioners and avoid
unduly burdening practitioners that engage in lawful, ethical practices.
Additionally, since the courts defer to the PTO's interpretations of its own
rules, there is little indication the courts would consider the unique business
needs of patent practitioners in interpreting PTO and states' ethics rules.
While several of the PTO's proposed rules seem to specifically target
invention-promoter companies and the unique abuses by these entities, the
PTO should guard against any potential adverse affects on patent
practitioners.
One increasingly problematic issue has been fraudulent activities by
invention-promoter companies. The current rules regulate such activity by
sanctioning attorneys that contribute to these abuses. However, as
demonstrated in Bender, such companies simply find other ways to
continue their activities once specific practitioners have been excluded
from practice. Although, the PTO's proposed rules offer creative ways in
which to limit practitioner involvement with invention-promoters, federal
and state regulations targeting abuses by such companies might be a better
alternative. The PTO must stay within its bounds of regulating activities of
practitioners that relate to practice before the office. Although additional
proposed rules can call attention to abuses by invention-promoters, such
rules cannot regulate the conduct directly. In attempting to regulate
unscrupulous conduct, the PTO should be careful to consider the costs and
burdens of patent prosecution.
Over the past few decades, patent
practitioners have developed innovative partnerships and fee-sharing
arrangements, including the use of flat fees, contingent fees and royalties.
Many of these arrangements are conducted ethically, and the PTO should
be cognizant of creating proposed rules or interpreting current rules in a

116. 37 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2008).
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manner that could prohibit ethical financial relationships that ultimately
discourage innovation.
The PTO Code has performed a vital function in ensuring a minimum
level of professional responsibility and ethics in the practice before it.
Over the past few decades, many commentators have criticized the
profession of law as becoming a business. 1 7 A profession has been
distinguished from a business by the extensive training, licensure, and code
of ethics elevating it above the norms in the marketplace. 1 8 Others have
categorized the practice of law as a profession of public service. 1 9 It is this
dedication to a profession and awareness of the importance of adequate
representation of a client that the PTO seeks to protect by enforcing its
Code of Professional Responsibility. In revising its rules, the PTO should
closely examine the business needs of today's practitioners and avoid
unclear, inconsistent and needless regulation, while still maintaining a high
level of professional responsibility among practitioners.

117. Wolters Kiuwer Financial Services v. Scivantage, et al., 525 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
118. Matter of Freeman, 311 N.E. 2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974).
119. Roscoe Pound, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODEM TIMES, 5 (1953).
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